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Introduction 
 
In the course of the past decade, political science has started paying increasing attention to the 
study of legislative oversight, which had been previously been described as “an important but 
inadequately researched area of legislative activity” (Lees, 1977). Lees’ comment is 
particularly true with regard to comparative analyses of oversight tools and practices. Some 
studies have recently discussed the instruments of legislative oversight (Maffio, 2002), other 
studies have instead investigated how legislative oversight relates to both political variables 
(Pennings, 2000; Damgaard, 2000; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004a) and socio-economic 
conditions (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004b). In spite of this renewed interest in the study of 
oversight, our understanding of legislative oversight, as Rockman lamented more than two 
decades ago (1984), is asymmetric. The literature has discussed extensively what oversight is, 
why it is necessary in properly functioning democratic regimes, why it is good from a 
normative point of view and what conditions might favor effective oversight. Yet, less 
attention has been paid to whether legislative oversight has any impact on the functioning of a 
political system and, if so, what kind of impact it has. 
The purpose of the present paper is to discuss whether and to what extent oversight 
affects the functioning or the nature of a political regime. Specifically we plan to test whether 
and to what extent the oversight potential, measured on the basis of the number of oversight 
  1tools available to a parliament in a given country, affects the probability that a country is 
formally democratic as well as the probability that a country is liberal democratic.
1
In the course of the paper we proceed in the following way. In the first section we 
discuss the legislative oversight literature and how this literature has investigated the 
determinants, the mechanisms, the tools and the possible consequences of legislative 
oversight of government activities. In this part of the paper we further argue that since 
democracy does not depend exclusively on the government’s ability to perform but also on 
the fact that the government action is subject to scrutiny and control, the probability that a 
country is democratic should be affected by the legislature’s potential to oversee the 
government.
2 In the second part of the paper, we present the results of our statistical analyses. 
Our findings are consistent with our hypotheses: the results of logistic regressions reveal that 
the probability that a country is formally democratic increases as the number of oversight 
tools increases. We also find that the probability that a country is liberal democratic is also 
sensitive to the number of oversight tools available to the parliament but not as much as the 
                                                 
1 The difference between oversight potential and effective oversight is, as we will discuss in the course of the 
paper, of great importance. We speak of effective oversight, when legislatures actually oversee governments’ 
actions and activities and when this oversight function has an impact on the political system and, more 
specifically, on the government behavior. We speak of oversight potential when legislatures to denote the set of 
formal powers and instruments that legislatures have to oversee government activities regardless of whether 
these powers and instruments are actually used. 
2 This view is obviously very different from Huntington (1991) argued several years ago. For Huntington (1991: 
9-10) “elections, open, free and fair are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non. Governments 
produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and 
incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These qualities may make such governments 
undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic”. Huntington’s position is questionable for at least two 
reasons. First of all, if instead of conceiving democracy as a dichotomous variable (a regime is democratic or 
non democratic) we conceive it instead as a continuous variable (a regime can be more or less democratic), the 
fact that a government is corrupt, irresponsible, unable or unwilling to address citizens’ demands certainly makes 
the political system less democratic than those systems in which governments are actually responsive, 
accountable and responsible. Second, it could also be argued that beyond a certain point, irresponsiveness, 
irresponsibility and non-accountability make governments non –democratic. Huntington’s faith in elections as a 
sine qua non must be considered with some skepticism. With the emergence of illiberal democracies we now 
know that elections are a necessary but insufficient condition for a political regime to be democratic. See 
Diamond (1999) and, more recently Carothers (2002).   
  2probability that a country is formally democratic.
3 In the third and final section of the paper 
we discuss the implications of our findings. In this respect we suggest that the results of our 
analyses are relevant for two basic reasons. First of all because they show that the oversight 
potential has a profound effect on the nature and the functioning of a political system. The 
probability that a country is formally democratic (and to a lesser extent the probability that a 
country is liberal democratic) is affected by the oversight potential. Second, the findings of 
our analyses are relevant because they show that international organizations were right in 
arguing that strengthening legislatures is actually beneficial to promote democracy and good 
governance. Our work shows however that while oversight potential is sufficient to promote 
(formal) democracy, the promotion of liberal democracy requires real and effective oversight 
instead and international organizations may have to find ways to promote effective oversight 
and not just oversight potential. 
 
Oversight in the Literature 
 
The study of legislative oversight is focused on four basic questions: what is 
oversight? Why is it good for a political system? How can oversight be exercised? And what 
is the impact of oversight? 
With regard to the first question, one could note that scholars have proposed fairly 
different definitions of what oversight is. Some scholars have, for example, suggested that 
                                                 
3 Formal democracies are political regimes characterized by vertical accountability through regular, free and fair 
election and by the lack of horizontal accountability. By contrast, liberal democracies are characterized by the 
fact that they are both vertically and horizontally accountable, that is by the fact that the power of the executive 
branch is constrained, checked and balanced by other branches of government and also by the fact that civil 
rights and political rights of individual and groups are protected. The Gastil index of Freedom, in spite of the fact 
that democracy and freedom are not exactly the same thing (Morlino, 1975; Katz, 1997), still provides a useful 
and usable measure of democracy or liberal democracy exactly because it estimates a country’s level of 
freedom/democracy by assessing the extent to which civil and political rights are respected. 
  3legislative oversight consists in the legislative supervision of the policies and the programs 
enacted by the government (Schick, 1976). Other scholars have noted instead that oversight is 
not just a supervision of what the executive branch of government has done but is also 
supervision of the executive’s legislative proposals (Maffio, 2002). In parliamentary systems, 
where the executive branch of government has the power to introduce a bill, the process 
trough which a bill becomes a law (the referral of that bill to specific committees, the 
discussion of the bill within such committees, the debates of a bill in the plenary and the fact 
that the parliament has ultimately the power to amend, approve or reject a government’s 
legislative proposal) gives the legislative branch of government the power oversee the 
government plans before they are actually enacted. This point has an obvious implication, 
namely that several of the activities and tasks that a legislature performs can be viewed as 
oversight activities. 
Regardless of whether oversight is viewed as a sort of ex post review of the 
government policies and programs or whether it is viewed instead as a supervision of 
government activities that can be performed both ex post and ex ante, scholars have generally 
agreed on the fact that effective oversight is good for the proper functioning of a democratic 
political system. Effective oversight is beneficial for a political system for, at least, two basic 
reasons (West and Cooper, 1989): first, because the oversight activity can actually contribute 
to improving the quality of the policies/programs initiated by the government; second, 
because as the government policies are ratified by the legislative branch, such policies acquire 
greater legitimacy. 
Scholars have also paid some attention to the tools that parliaments and legislatures 
can employ to oversee the government and the government’s activities. These studies have 
  4underlined that the legislatures may adopt several tools to oversee the actions of the 
executives such as hearings in committees, hearings in the plenary assembly, the creation of 
inquiry committees, parliamentary questions, question time, the interpellations and the 
ombudsman (Maffio, 2002; Pennings, 2000). Scholars have noted, however, that the presence 
of the oversight tool is a necessary but insufficient condition for effective oversight. Effective 
oversight, as was observed, depends not only on the availability of oversight tools, but 
depends also on additional conditions. Effective oversight may depend on the specific 
oversight powers given to the parliament, on whether the parliament has the ability to modify 
legislation (Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979), on whether parliaments and parliamentarians 
are given proper information to perform their oversight tasks adequately (Frantzich, 1979), on 
the role of individual MPs, on the role of committee chairs, on the saliency of issues and on 
how aggressively the opposition performs its role (Rockman, 1984).
4     
In spite of the wealth of information generated by the study of legislative oversight 
with regard to the virtues, the tools and the conditions of effective oversight, much less has 
been written with regard to the impact of oversight. Does oversight actually affect the 
functioning and possibly the nature of a political system? The question is interesting not only 
for scholars dealing with specific themes of the legislative studies literature, this question is 
important also from a practical point of view. In the course of the past decade, international 
organizations, agencies and NGOs have taken a much greater role in promoting democracy 
(Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2002; NDI, 2000). They have tried to promote democracy, among 
other things, by strengthening legislatures and they have tried to strengthen legislatures by 
                                                 
4 Though high partisanship and fierce opposition may be conducive to more effective oversight in general, 
studies on Public Accounts Committees, have argued instead that co-operation between the committee members 
across party lines is critical in promoting effective oversight of the public accounts (Stapenhurst et alii, 2005). 
  5improving legislatures’ ability to oversee government activities.
5 Hence, the question is: does 
oversight actually make a difference as international organizations have assumed?  
Given the nature of the data at our disposal, we are not able to test whether and to 
what extent effective oversight affects the functioning of a political regime, the democratic 
quality of that regime or that regime’s chances to be democratic. We cannot produce this kind 
of analysis because our data (concerning the number of oversight tools available to a given 
legislature) provide a (more or less) clear indication of a parliament’s oversight potential, but 
they provide no indication of whether oversight is performed and performed effectively. 
Hence, given the impossibility of testing what is the impact of effective oversight on the basis 
of the data at our disposal, we will test instead whether oversight potential has any impact on 
a political system. 
In this respect we argue that as the oversight potential increases, it becomes easier to 
scrutinize and control the government and its activities, and since controlling the government 
is a key component of democratic government, the more a government is subject to potential 
control, the more likely it is for the political system to be democratic. In other words, 
                                                 
5 Given the interest in legislative strengthening and in improving parliaments’ oversight capabilities, 
international organizations have done some studies to see whether oversight is beneficial to the functioning of a 
given political regime. The studies found that most countries have some instruments to oversee the actions of the 
government and that legislature in parliamentary regimes have on average a greater number of oversight tools 
than legislatures in presidential and semi-presidential regimes (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004a; Pelizzo and 
Stapenhurst, 2004b). Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2004b) have however emphasized that the number of oversight 
tools that a legislature can employ to oversee the executive provides an indication of the oversight potential of 
that legislature, but it does not provide any indication as to whether that oversight potential is then translated in 
effective oversight. This is why, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2004b) argued, some countries may have a great 
oversight potential and yet be non-democratic. In these countries, legislatures have several oversight tools at 
their disposal but they are either unwilling or unable to use them effectively or to use them at all. This is why in 
some countries like Gabon, Indonesia and Zambia, the oversight potential does not seem to have any effect on 
the democratic quality of the regime. However, the evidence presented in these international organizations’ 
publications was at best suggestive. It showed that, on average, liberal-democratic regime had more oversight 
tools and oversight potential than formally or quasi-democratic regimes and that these, in their turn, had a greater 
oversight potential than non-democratic regimes. But the fact that more democratic regime tend to have, on 
average, more oversight tool than less democratic regime does not tell us the adoption of a larger number of 
oversight tools is a consequence or a cause of the higher democratic quality in a given country.  
 
  6oversight potential is a cause and not a consequence of democratic quality. Having 
hypothesized this possible causal relationship, we need to test whether there is any empirical, 
or rather statistical, evidence sustaining the claim that the probability that a country is 
democratic increases as the oversight potential increases. The purpose of the next section is to 
perform some statistical analyses to show whether and to what extent the causal relationship 
between democratic quality and oversight potential is actually corroborated by the results of 
statistical analyses.   
 
 
Data and findings 
 
The data concerning the oversight tools where collected by a survey conducted by World 
Bank Institute (WBI) in collaboration with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and have 
previously been presented in some working papers by the World Bank Institute (Pelizzo and 
Stapenhurst, 2004b; Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson, 2004). Responses to the WBI-IPU 
questionnaire were provided by the parliaments of 82 countries and by the European 
Parliament. The information provided by the respondents is presented both in table 1 and, in 
greater detail, in the appendix. The responses indicate that, with the exception of Lesotho, 
which did not provide any information whatsoever as to whether and how many oversight 
tools are available to the parliament, most parliaments have several oversight tools at their 
disposal. If we consider that some respondents did not indicate whether specific oversight 
tools are used by the parliament, it is safe to conclude that the average number of oversight 
  7tools available to parliaments and legislatures worldwide is actually greater than what the 
responses collected by the WBI-IPU survey suggests. 
[table 1 about here] 
Be that as it may, 49 of the 83 parliaments that responded to the survey, provided 
complete information as to the presence/absence of the seven oversight tools mentioned in the 
survey conducted by the WBI and IPU. The seven oversight tools are committee hearings, 
hearings in plenary sittings, inquiry commissions, questions, question time, interpellations and 
the ombudsman. The countries included in this 49-country sample differ with regard to the 
level of democracy (as measured by the Gastil index), the income level (low income, middle 
income, and high income) and form of government (presidential, semi-presidential, 
parliamentary). 
[table 2 about here] 
Only 47 of the 49 countries that provided complete information as to the number of 
oversight tools available to parliament, also provided information as their form of 
government. The results, presented in table 2, show that slightly less than 30 percent of the 
countries included in our 47-country sample adopt either a presidential or semi-presidential 
form of government, 42.5 percent of the countries adopt a parliamentary form of government.  
The data reported in table 3 also indicate that the number of oversight tools available to 
legislatures in parliamentary systems is on average higher than the number of oversight tools 
available to legislatures in either presidential or semi-presidential systems. 
[table 3 about here] 
Information concerning the income level was available for all the countries included in our 49 
countries sample. We measure income level on the basis of the criteria used by the World 
  8Bank. In the 2002 World Development Indicators published by the World Bank countries are 
divided in three groups: “High Income Economies”, in which the gross national income (GNI) 
per capita was $ 9,266 or more;  “Middle Income Economies”, which have a GNI per capita 
of  between $ 755 to 9,265; and “Low Income Economies”, in which  the GNI per capita is 
below $ 755.
6 We find that our sample is fairly balanced: 30.6 percent of the countries in our 
sample are high-income countries, 32.6 percent of  them belongs to the middle income 
category, while 36.7 percent of the countries falls in the low-income category. The data in 
table 4 further suggest that the number of oversight tools available to middle- and high-
income countries is substantially higher than the number of oversight tools available to 
parliaments in low-income countries. 
[table 4 about here] 
Political scientists and sociologists have developed over the years several measures of 
democracy (Morlino, 1974; Bollen, 1980; Bollen, 1993). The most common and most widely 
adopted in spite of some of its possible shortcomings is the Gastil Index of Freedom. 
Diamond (1999), for example, categorizes the world’s countries as liberal-democratic, 
formally democratic and non-democratic depending on whether these countries are ranked as 
free, partially free or non-free on the basis of the scores assigned by Freedom House. The 
Freedom House computes an annual index of freedom for all the countries in the world. This 
index is computed in the following way. The Freedom House assigns to each country a 
political rights and a civil rights score. Both scores are 7-point scales. The Gastil index is 
measured by adding the political rights score to the civil rights score and by dividing their 
sum by two. This means that if a country has a political rights score of 3 and a civil rights 
                                                 
6 We transformed this information into a quantitative variable to be used in our statistical analyses, by assigning 
value 1 to countries in the Low Income group, value 2 to countries in the Middle Income group and value 3 to 
countries that belong to the High Income group. 
  9score of 4, the freedom score for this country is (3+4)/2=3.5. Countries that score from 1 to 
2.5 points on this scale are considered free; countries scoring from 3 to 5.5 are considered as 
partially free and countries with a score of 5.5 or higher belong to the group of non-free 
countries.
7 Data presented in table 5 reveal that 55.1 percent of the countries included in our 
sample are liberal democratic, 28.6 percent of them are formally democratic and 16.3 percent 
of them are non-democratic. 
The nature of the countries included in our sample allows the analyst to test whether 
and to what extent the probability that a country is formally democratic and the probability 
that a country is liberal democratic are affected by the number of oversight tools available to 
the parliament controlling for the effects of the form of government and the income level.
8
To test whether the probability that a country is at least formally democratic is 
affected by the number of oversight tools, we run the following model: 
Logit (democracy) = a+ b1 Tools+ b2 gofor + b3 incomelevel (1) 
                                                 
7 We constructed a tri-chotomus variable by assigning values 1, 2 and 3 to countries that were ranked 
respectively as non-free, partially free and free. Though we are aware of the fact that freedom and democracy are 
not exactly the same thing, we adopt, as is often done in the literature, the Gastil index of freedom as our 
measure of democracy, so that non-free, partially free, and free countries are treated respectively as non-
democratic, formally democratic (or quasi democratic), and liberal democratic. 
8 We control for the effects of income level, as a proxy for development, as scholars have long acknowledged 
that democratic countries are generally better off in material terms than non-democratic ones  (Lipset, 1959). 
Lipset’s statement concerning the relationship between democracy and development received two different, 
though not mutually exclusive. For some scholars (Rueschenmeyer, Huber and Stephens, 1992) Lipset was 
arguing, as scholars working within the modernization theory framework later argued, that development creates 
the condition for democratic transition (Huntington, 1991). Other scholars gave a different interpretation of 
Lipset’s words as they thought that Lipset was positing a relationship between development and democratic 
consolidation. Recent research carried out by Przeworski et alii tested both theoretical claims. Przeworski’s work 
showed that the relationship between democracy and development is still strong (Przeworski et alii, 2000:79), 
that the level of development is not particularly good predictor of transitions to democracy (Przeworski et alii, 
2000:92-98), and that development is a strong predictor of democratic consolidation (Przeworski et alii, 
2000:98). We also control for the effects of the form of government as a fairly large body of literature has argued 
(and often demonstrated) that democratic regimes are less likely to consolidate in presidential democracies than 
they are in parliamentary systems (Linz, 1994; Mainwaring, 1993; Sartori, 1994a; Sartori, 1994b; Stepan and 
Skach, 1994; Przeworski et alii, 2000: 128-137). Hence there is some reason to believe that the probability that a 
country is democratic may be influenced by the form of government adopted in that country.  
  10Where the democracy variable takes value 1 for countries that are at least formally 
democratic. The number of oversight tools variables ranges, as we mentioned above, from 2 
to 7. The gofor variable refers to the form of government. This variable takes value 1 for 
presidential systems, value 2 for semi-presidential systems and value 3 for parliamentary 
systems. The incomelevel variable takes respectively values 1, 2 and 3 for low income, 
middle income and high income countries. 
By performing this analysis we find that our model takes the following values: 
 
Logit(democracy) = - 4.915+ .713 Tools+.053 gofor+1.487incomelevel (2) 
                                    (.008)   (.010)        (.913)          (.018) 
 
The form of government variable, as we can see from the p-values reported in parenthesis, is 
entirely insignificant and it is legitimate to exclude it from the model. By dropping the gofor 
variable, our model takes the following values: 
 
Logit(democracy) = - 4.958 + .775 tools + 1.262 incomelevel (3) 
                                    (.002)   (.005)           (.023) 
 
The meaning of this findings is quite clear. Even when we control for the effects of the 
income level, we find that the coefficient for the number of oversight tools is strong and 
statistically significant. In a middle income country with seven oversight tools, the equation 
gives the following result: 
Logit(democracy) = -4.958 + .775(7) + 1.262 (2)=     
Logit(democracy) = -4.958 + 5.425 + 2.524 = 2.991 
 
In this case, the probability that the political system of that country is democratic is  
 = .952 or 95.2 per cent.   ) 1 /(
99 . 2 99 . 2
e e +
  11This means that a middle income country has a phenomenally high chance of being at 
least formally democratic when all seven oversight tools are available to the parliament. The 
data presented in table 6 provide a clear indication of how (and how much) the probability 
that a country is at least formally democratic increases varies as the number of oversight tools 
available to the parliament changes.  
[table 6 about here] 
Diamond (1999) noted that formal democracies are effectively quasi democracies. They have 
the forms, the mechanisms, and the institutions that can be found in properly democratic 
regimes, but they do not really function like real democracies. Hence, we might want to shift 
the focus of our analysis and investigate whether the probability that a country is liberal 
democratic changes as the number of oversight tools available to that country’s parliament 
increases. In order to test whether the probability that a country is liberal democratic is 
affected by the number of oversight tools, we run the following logistic regression model: 
 
Logit(liberaldemocracy) = a + b1Tools +b2 Incomelevel (4) 
 
Where the liberaldemocracy variable takes value 1 for countries that are ranked as free by the 
Gastil index of freedom, while it takes a value of 0 (zero) otherwise. Both the tools  variable 
and the incomelevel variable take the values specified above. With these considerations in 
mind, when we run our model we find that it takes the following values: 
 
Logit(liberaldemocracy) = -7.193 + .576 tools + 2.162 incomelevel  (5) 
                                                               (.000)     (.036)           (.000) 
 
  12The coefficient for our tools variable is still positive, is still fairly strong, but is not as 
statistically significant as the incomelevel variable. It should also be noted that the tools 
variable in equation (5) is weaker and much less significant than in the equation model  (3). 
Be as it may, the number of oversight tools in a middle income country still increases the 
probability that a country is liberal democratic. This conclusion if we compare the probability 
that a middle income country is liberal democratic when it has only two oversight tools with 
the probability that a middle income country is liberal democratic when it has seven oversight 
tools. 
When a middle income country has only two oversight tools, our equation (5) takes the 
following values: 
Logit(liberaldemocracy) = -7.193 + .576 (2) + 2.162 (2) =  -1.72  (6) 
This means that the probability that such a country is liberal democratic is:   = 
.152 or 15.2 per cent. 
) 1 /(
72 . 1 72 . 1 − −
+ e e
When a middle income country has instead seven oversight tools, our equation (5) takes the 
following values: 
Logit(liberaldemocracy) = -7.193 + .576 (7) + 2.162 (2) = 1.16 (7) 
This means that the probability that such a country is liberal democratic is: 
) 1 /(
16 . 1 16 . 1
e e +  = .762 or 76.2 per cent. 
As we can see from the data presented in table 7, as the number of oversight tools increases, 
the probability that a country is liberal democratic also increases, but this increase is not as 
marked as the probability that a country is only formally democratic. In fact, while there is 
about a 95 percent probability that a middle income country with seven oversight tools is 
formally democratic, the probability that this country is liberal democratic is just 76.2 percent 
  13[table 7 about here] 
 
The meaning of these findings is fairly clear: a parliament’s oversight potential, as measured 
by the number of oversight tools, makes a difference as to whether that country is liberal 
democratic. Our data also reveal that the oversight potential exercises greater influence on the 
probability that a country is democratic than on the probability that a country is liberal 
democratic. Why? The data at our disposal do not allow one to answer this question 
conclusively, but one can nonetheless formulate some educated guesses as to why the 
relationship between oversight potential and the probability that a country is liberal 
democratic is so tenuous.  
Our answer in this respect is that what liberal democracy needs is not just potential 
oversight or oversight potential, but real and effective oversight. This is the major difference 
between formally democratic and liberal democratic regimes. In formally democratic regimes 
democratic institutions have only a cosmetic function. There are present and they are not 
effectively used. This is the case for other types of democratic institutions, and, we suspect, is 
also the case with regard to oversight tools. Parliaments in formally democratic regimes do 
adopt oversight tools, as if they were to effectively oversee the government actions, but these 
tools are not used or, at least, are not used effectively. Hence, in the case of formal 
democracies, the form of democratic government is respected but not its substance. 
By contrast, liberal democracies are concerned with the substance of democracy and 
not just its form. The presence of oversight tools, of oversight potential, is not enough. What 
is peculiar to the liberal democratic regimes is the fact that the governments are not only 
empowered to perform their duties and tasks but that they are subject to control. Governments 
  14have the power to govern, but this power is constrained and governments are, or at least may 
be asked, to provide justifications for their actions or inactions. And, at least in parliamentary 
systems, if they fail to justify their course of actions to the legislatures, they may be voted out 
of office. Hence, while the presence of oversight tools is a necessary condition for effective 
oversight, it is not, by itself, sufficient. In addition to parliaments’ oversight potential, there 
must also be some political will to actually oversee government activities—a will that may 
sometimes be lacking. In his study of Public Accounts Committees, McGee (2002) showed 
that one of the major obstacles that Public Accounts Committee encounter in their attempt to 
oversee governments accounts is that parliamentarians often are unwilling to engage in 
serious oversight of the government accounts.
9 Scrutinizing the government accounts is 
considered to be a job that gives little visibility to MPs, and that does not help members to be 
re-elected. Worse, MPs belonging to the government party (or coalition) fear that by 
scrutinizing governments accounts they may be forced to chose between performing their 
oversight functions effectively (and possibly straining their relationship between an MP and 
its party) and preserving a strong tie to their party.
10 Therefore, while some parliaments may 
have Public Accounts Committees, the presence of these committees is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for effective scrutiny of government accounts. If this conclusion could be 
extended from the particular case of the Public Account Committees to the oversight tools in 
general, we could then explain why the presence of oversight tools does not necessarily 
amount to effective oversight—which is what is actually needed for a country to be (and be 
considered) liberal democratic. 
                                                 
9 In spite of the fact that Public Accounts Committees are proper oversight committees, that is committees 
established to oversee government accounts, the list of oversight tools considered by the WBI-IPU survey did 
not include the Public Accounts Committees. On Public Accounts Committees see also Wehner (2003; 2005). 
10 The reasons why partisanship may represent a major obstacle to the proper functioning of Public Accounts 
Committees are discussed by Stapenhurst et alii (2005). 
  15 
Conclusions 
 
The purpose of the present paper was to investigate the relationship between the number of 
oversight tools available to a parliament on the one hand and the probability that a country is 
formally democratic and/or liberal democratic on the other hand. By analyzing the survey data 
collected by the WBI in collaboration with the IPU, we have found that the number of 
oversight tools is a strong predictor of whether a country is at least formally democratic. In 
fact, we found that the probability that a country is formally democratic increases as the 
number of oversight tools increases. In this respect we found that when a middle income 
country has all the even oversight tools for which the WBI-IPU sought information are 
available to a parliament, there is a 95 percent probability that such a country is formally 
democratic. We also found that while the probability that a country is liberal democratic 
increases as the number of oversight tools available to the parliament increases, but we 
observed that the relationship between oversight potential and liberal democracy is neither as 
strong nor as significant as the relationship between formal democracy and oversight 
potential. In this respect, we suggested that this difference may be explained by the fact that 
liberal democratic regimes are concerned not only with the formal aspects of democracy such 
as  the presence of democratic mechanisms and institutions, but that they are concerned with 
the substance of democracy. Liberal democracies do not simply need oversight potential, they 
need effective oversight. We further noted that parliaments, in order to exercise oversight 
effectively, do not simply need the tools with which they can oversee the government actions 
but they also need the political will to do so. 
  16These findings suggest two additional considerations. First of all, our analyses, by 
showing that legislative oversight is good for democracy, confirm what several international 
organizations have often assumed, namely that strengthening legislatures (and legislature’s 
oversight potential) is good for democracy. Our findings also show not only that legislatures 
(and strong legislatures) are good for democracy as recent studies have underlined (Fish, 
2006) but also why legislatures make such a significant contribution to democratic 
governance. By performing their oversight function, parliaments play a major role in keeping 
governments responsive and accountable for their actions, and, by doing so, are instrumental 
in preventing possible abuses of power. Second, our analyses further suggest that while 
international organizations were correct in arguing that strengthening legislatures was critical 
for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, they probably need to reconsider their 
legislature-strengthening strategies (NDI 2000; NDI, 2001; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004b). 
In the past it was believed that legislatures could simply be strengthened by increasing their 
oversight potential. Our analyses support a slightly different view. Parliaments must have not 
only the tools but also the political will to oversee the government, because what liberal 
democracy needs is effective oversight and not just oversight potential. Hence, the major 
challenge for the international organizations concerned with the promotion and the 
consolidation of democracy is to identify and promote the conditions under which parliaments 
and parliamentarians are more likely to engage in effective oversight of the government 
activities. 
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  20Table 1. Countries and the Number of Parliamentary Oversight Tools 
0 2  3  4  5  6  7 
Lesotho Azerbaijan 
Russia 
Congo 
Macedonia 
Tajikistan 
Zimbabwe 
Angola  
Armenia 
China 
Ivory Coast 
Kazakhstan 
Liechtenstein 
Rwanda 
Uruguay 
Australia  
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
Iran 
Jordan 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Nicaragua 
Palau 
Philippines 
Samoa 
Senegal 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
Yemen 
Andorra  
Belarus  
Benin  
Brazil  
Canada 
Cyprus 
EU 
Germany 
Guatemala 
Guinea Bissau 
Guinea 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Korea 
Jamaica 
Latvia 
Luxembourg 
Namibia 
Netherlands 
Niger 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Tchad 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
U.K. 
Austria 
Belgium 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Czech Republic
Estonia 
France 
Gabon 
Greece 
Hungary 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Lithuania 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Romania 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Zambia 
 
Note: The score of the countries in Italics indicates that information concerning the presence/absence of 
some tools of parliamentary information was not available as indicated in Appendix. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  21Table 2. Form of Government and Number of Parliamentary Oversight Tools. 
Form of 
Government 
4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Presidential 
Ivory Coast 
Kazakhstan 
Nicaragua 
Palau 
Benin 
Brazil 
Cyprus 
Guinea 
Korea 
Tchad 
Tunisia 
Costa Rica 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
Parliamentary  
Liechtenstein Australia 
Turkey 
Canada 
Germany 
Guinea Bissau 
Jamaica 
Luxembourg 
United Kingdom 
Austria 
Belgium 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Greece 
Hungary 
Japan 
Lithuania 
Spain 
Sweden 
 
 
Semi-Presidential 
Angola 
Armenia 
Rwanda 
Cameroon 
Senegal 
Yemen 
Niger 
Togo 
Yugoslavia 
France 
Gabon 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Romania 
 
 
Table 3. Number of Oversight Tools by Form of Government 
Number of Oversight Tools 
Form of Government  4  5  6  7  Tot  Mean 
Presidential  2 2 7 2 13  5.69 
Semi-Presidential  3 3 3 5 14  5.71 
Parliamentary  1 2 6 11  20  6.35 
Total  6  7  16 18 47  
 
 
 
Table 4. Number of Oversight Tools by Income Level 
Number of Oversight Tools 
Income  Level  4 5 6 7 Total  Mean 
Low  4 4 7 3 18  5.50 
Middle  1 2 5 8 16  6.25 
High    1 1 6 7 15  6.27 
Total      49   
 
 
 
  22Table 5. Number of Oversight Tools by Level of Democracy 
Number of Oversight Tools 
Level of Democracy  4  5  6  7  Total  Mean 
Democracy  1 2 9 15  27  6.41 
Quasi  Democracy  2 3 6 3 14  5.71 
Non  Democracy  3 2 3   8 5.0 
Total  6  7  18 18 49  
 
Table 6. Number of Oversight Tools and the probability that a country is formally democratic 
İf in a middle income country the number of 
oversight tools is 
The probability that a country is formally 
democratic is: 
0 .08 
1 .16 
2 .29 
3 .47 
4 .66 
5 .81 
6 .90 
7 .95 
 
Table 7. Number of Oversight Tools and th probability that a country is liberal democratic 
İf in a middle income country the number of 
oversight tools is 
The probability that a country is liberal-democratic 
is: 
0 .05 
1 .09 
2 .15 
3 .24 
4 .36 
5 .50 
6 .64 
7 .76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  23Appendix. The Tools of Parliamentary Oversight. 
Country Committee 
Hearing 
Hearing in 
plenary 
sitting 
Commissi
on of 
enquiry 
Questions Question 
time 
Interpellati
ons 
Ombudsman 
Andorra  yes yes yes yes yes n.a.  yes 
Angola  yes no yes yes no yes  no 
Armenia yes yes no yes yes no  no 
Austria  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Australia yes no Yes  yes yes no  yes 
Azerbaijan n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  no  n.a.  yes  yes 
Belarus  yes yes yes yes yes yes  n.a. 
Belgium  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Benin  yes yes yes yes yes yes  no 
Brazil  yes yes yes yes no yes  yes 
Bulgaria  yes yes yes yes yes n.a.  no 
Cameroon  yes yes yes yes yes no  no 
Canada    yes yes yes yes yes yes  no 
China  yes yes yes yes n.a. no  n.a. 
Congo n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  yes  no  yes  yes 
Costa  Rica  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Croatia  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Czech 
Republic 
yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Cyprus  yes yes yes yes yes no  yes 
Estonia  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
EU  yes yes yes yes n.a. yes  yes 
France  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Gabon  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Germany yes yes yes yes no yes  yes 
Greece  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Guatemala  yes yes yes yes yes yes  n.a. 
Guinea 
Bissau 
yes yes yes yes yes yes  no 
Guinea  yes yes yes yes yes yes  no 
Hungary  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Iceland  yes yes yes yes yes n.a.  yes 
Indonesia yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Iran  yes yes yes yes no yes  n.a. 
Ireland  yes yes yes yes yes n.a.  yes 
Ivory Coast  no  no  yes  yes  yes  no  yes 
Kazakhstan  no yes yes yes yes no  no 
Korea  yes yes yes yes yes no  yes 
Jamaica  yes yes yes yes yes no  yes 
Japan  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Jordan  yes yes yes yes no n.a.  yes 
Latvia  yes yes yes yes n.a. yes  yes 
Lesotho  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. 
Liechtenstei
n 
yes yes no yes no yes  no 
Lithuania yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Luxembourg  yes yes yes yes yes yes  no 
Macedonia n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  yes  no  yes  yes 
Madagascar  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Mali  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Mexico yes  yes  yes  no  yes  n.a.  yes 
  24Mongolia yes yes yes yes yes n.a.  no 
Namibia  yes yes yes yes yes n.a.  yes 
Netherlands  yes yes yes yes yes n.a.  yes 
Nicaragua  yes yes yes no no yes  yes 
Niger  yes yes yes yes yes yes  no 
Palau  yes no yes yes no yes  yes 
Philippines  n.a. yes yes yes yes n.a.  yes 
Poland  yes yes yes yes yes n.a.  yes 
Romania yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Russia  n.a. n.a. n.a. yes n.a. n.a.  yes 
Rwanda no  no  no  yes  yes  yes yes 
Samoa  n.a. yes yes yes yes no  yes 
Senegal  yes yes yes yes no  no  yes 
Singapore  yes yes yes yes yes n.a.  no 
Spain  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Slovak 
Republic 
yes yes n.a. yes yes yes  yes 
Slovenia  yes yes n.a. yes yes yes  yes 
South Africa  yes  yes  n.a.  yes  yes  no  yes 
Sudan  yes yes yes yes yes n.a.  no 
Sweden  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Switzerland  yes yes yes yes yes yes  no 
Tajikistan  n.a. n.a. yes yes n.a. yes  n.a. 
Tchad  yes no yes yes yes yes  yes 
Thailand yes yes yes yes yes n.a.  yes 
Togo  yes yes yes yes yes yes  no 
Tunisia  yes yes yes yes yes no  yes 
Turkey  yes yes yes yes yes no  no 
Uganda  yes yes yes yes yes n.a.  yes 
Ukraine  n.a. yes n.a. yes yes yes  yes 
United 
Kingdom 
yes yes yes yes yes no  yes 
Uruguay yes no yes  yes  n.a.  yes  no 
Zambia  yes yes yes yes no yes  yes 
Zimbabwe  n.a. n.a. n.a. yes yes n.a.  yes 
Yemen  yes yes yes yes yes no  no 
Yugoslavia  yes yes yes yes yes yes  no 
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